Claims Reporting and Risk Bearing Moral Hazard in Workers' Compensation : The Canadian Context by Baril, Guylaine & Lanoie, Paul
Série Scientifique
Scientific Series
96s-05
Claims Reporting and Risk Bearing
Moral Hazard in Workers'
Compensation : The Canadian
Context
Guylaine Baril, Paul Lanoie 
Montréal
janvier 1996
Ce document est publié dans l’intention de rendre accessibles les résultats préliminaires de la
recherche effectuée au CIRANO, afin de susciter des échanges et des suggestions.  Les idées et les
opinions émises sont sous l’unique responsabilité des auteurs, et ne représentent pas nécessairement
les positions du CIRANO ou de ses partenaires.
This paper presents preliminary research carried out at CIRANO and aims to encourage
discussion and comment.  The observations and viewpoints expressed are the sole responsibility
of the authors.  They do not necessarily represent positions of CIRANO or its partners.
CIRANO
Le CIRANO est une corporation privée à but non lucratif constituée en vertu de la Loi
des compagnies du Québec.  Le financement de son infrastructure et de ses activités
de recherche provient des cotisations de ses organisations-membres, d’une subvention
d’infrastructure du ministère de l’Industrie, du Commerce, de la Science et de la
Technologie, de même que des subventions et mandats obtenus par ses équipes de
recherche.  La Série Scientifique est la réalisation d’une des missions que s’est
données le CIRANO, soit de développer l’analyse scientifique des organisations et des
comportements stratégiques.
CIRANO is a private non-profit organization incorporated under the Québec
Companies Act.  Its infrastructure and research activities are funded through fees
paid by member organizations, an infrastructure grant from the Ministère de
l’Industrie, du Commerce, de la Science et de la Technologie, and grants and
research mandates obtained by its research teams.  The Scientific Series fulfils one
of the missions of CIRANO: to develop the scientific analysis of organizations and
strategic behaviour.
Les organisations-partenaires / The Partner Organizations
•Ministère de l’Industrie, du Commerce, de la Science et de la Technologie.
•École des Hautes Études Commerciales.
•École Polytechnique.
•Université de Montréal.
•Université Laval.
•McGill University.
•Université du Québec à Montréal.
•Bell Québec.
•La Caisse de dépôt et de placement du Québec.
•Hydro-Québec.
•Fédération des caisses populaires de Montréal et de l’Ouest-du-Québec.
•Téléglobe Canada.
•Société d’électrolyse et de chimie Alcan Ltée.
•Avenor.
•Service de développement économique de la ville de Montréal.
•Raymond, Chabot, Martin, Paré
ISSN 1198-8177
 All correspondence should be sent to Paul Lanoie, École des Hautes Études Commerciales, 5255%
Decelles, Montréal, Canada, H3T 1V6. E-mail : paul.lanoie@hec.ca. Financial support from FCAR is
gratefully acknowledged.
 École des Hautes Études Commerciales†
 École des Hautes Études Commerciales et CIRANO‡
Claims Reporting and Risk Bearing
Moral Hazard in Workers'
Compensation : The Canadian Context%
Guylaine Baril , Paul Lanoie  † ‡
Résumé / Abstract
Ce texte explore les mécanismes canadiens d'indemnisations pour
accidents du travail en reproduisant avec des données canadiennes l'étude de Butler
et Worrall (1991). Ces auteurs furent les premiers à développer un modèle simple
pour distinguer deux types de risque moral liés à l'indemnisation des accidents du
travail : Le risque lié au comportement préventif et le risque lié à la déclaration
d'accidents. Le premier est associé à la tendance des travailleurs de prendre plus de
risque lorsque la générosité des indemnisations augmente, alors que le second est
associé à leur propension à faire une réclamation lorsqu'ils ont un accident.
L'estimation de ces deux types de risque moral, avec des données canadiennes,
donne des résultats trés différents de ceux présentés par Butler et Worrall.
This paper explores the Canadian context of workers' compensation
(WC) by replicating, with Canadian data, a study carried out by Butler and
Worrall (1991). These authors were the first to develop a simple model to
separate claims reporting and risk bearing moral hazard in WC. Risk bearing
moral hazard reflects the workers' incentive to carry more risk and consequently
experience more accidents when benefits rise, while claims reporting moral
hazard mirrors workers' incentive to file a claim. The estimation of these two
moral hazard effects leads to results quite different with Canadian data than with
American data.
Mots Clés : Accidents du travail, indemnisations, risque moral
Keywords : Worplace Accidents, Workers'Compensation, Moral Hazard
 For example, see Worrall and Appel (1982), Butler (1983), Butler and1
Worrall (1983), Chelius and Kavanaugh (1988) and Krueger (1990).
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I. Introduction
Since the early eightys, more attention has been devoted to the analysis of the
workers' compensation systems and particularly, the study of the effects of benefit
levels on safety incentives. This growing interest about workers'compensation is
primarily due to the increasing importance of this form of social insurance. In Canada,
from 1970 to 1993, there has been an average of 1 million occupational injuries
reported each year by the different Workers' Compensation Boards (WBC). In 1993,
about $5.2 billion in benefits have been paid out by the WBCs.  Given that the cost of
occupational injuries has steadily increased in the late twenty years, it is increasingly
relevant to evaluate, among other things, the different impacts caused by a change in
benefit levels.
The theorical effect of an increase in compensation benefits on the incidence
of workplace accidents is ambiguous.  On the one hand, if benefits increase, there
could be incentives for workers to fill more claims because the cost of being on a
claim decreases.  On the other hand, the increasing benefits may lead the experience
rated firm to induce more safety on the workplace in order to reduce the number of
claims being filled, and so, to cut its insurance premium to the WCB.  Empirically, a
majority of studies have found that an increase in benefits leads to an increase in the
reported injury rate .1
When the benefits rise induce the worker to fill more claims, two types of
moral hazard could be implied. The worker could take more job risk and more on-the-
job accidents will occur, this is "risk bearing" moral hazard.  However, as mentioned
above, this effect may be mitigated by firms expanding their resources devoted to
safety, so that the net impact on the incidence of injuries may be negative.
Furthermore, the worker could fill more claims without taking more risk and so
without affecting the actual injuries level, this is "claims reporting" moral hazard.
Butler and Worrall (1991) were the first to elaborate a simple method to distinguish
these two types of moral hazard. They found that the positive effect due to claims
reporting moral hazard more than offsets the negative effect associated with the risk
bearing moral hazard. That may explain how workplace safety may be improving over
time, while reported claims increase as real benefits increase.
Since these authors have expressed their interest in applying the same
method to other data, to confirm the credibility of their approach, we decided to use
this approach with Canadian data.
2The Canadian workers'compensation system being fairly different from its
American counterpart, we have to mention some of these differences. Firstly, the
Canadian systems are more generous with replacement rates of 75 % of gross weekly
earning or 90 % of after-tax earnings, comparatively to 66 % of gross weekly earnings
in most American states. Secondly, in Canada, workers' compensation is provided by
government-operated WCBs, each provincial's board being independent of the others,
and the premium-rating procedures are established by government directives, while
most WC services are provided by private carriers in the U.S., who establish their own
premium-rating structures.  As a result, experience rating is more frequent in the
United States than in Canada, where most of the industries is nonexperience or flat-
rated (see Vaillancourt, 1994).  Moreover, in certain important provinces including
Quebec, the worker's own physician has to establish the validity of a workplace
accident, while in other provinces and in most American states, injured workers are
seen by specialized physicians chosen by the board.
In this paper, we attempt to estimate the empirical magnitude of the risk
bearing moral hazard and of the claims reporting moral hazard with Canadian data.
Our results are very different from those found by Butler and Worrall.  We obtain that
risk bearing moral hazard influences positively the incidence of injuries, while claims
reporting moral hazard have a negative effect. Section II presents briefly the theory on
which is based the Butler and Worrall's approach. In section III, we present the data
used for this analysis. Section IV discusses the empirical results and section V
concludes.
  
II. The Theory
Even in the absence of moral hazard, it is expected that an increase in the
expected indemnity payment will lead to an increase in the expected cost per claim,
in a naive actuarial sense, this relationship being one to one. When moral hazard is
present this relationship is complicated by the presence of claims reporting and risk
bearing moral hazards.  The approach developed by Butler and Worrall (1991)
distinguishes the latter two effects. 
Their approach is based principally on two assumptions. Firstly, in the
absence of moral hazard, the expected benefits must predict actual average indemnity
costs perfectly. When the expected benefits are calculated as to correspond to the
indemnity payments for a typical worker and assuming the frequency and severity of
claims is unchanged, the expected benefits should exactly reflect average costs per
worker. So, that method of computing benefits would allow the separation of the
actuarial and moral hazard effects. 
 For the model derivation and more explanations, see Butler and Worrall2
(1991).
3
Secondly, they assume that tendencies in real medical costs represent total
medical damages associated with compensable workplace injuries, since workers'
compensation pays for practically unlimited medical care. In this case, the relevant
element is to correctly deflate the medical costs so that they could account for the
higher costs of medical care. In fact, in absence of claims reporting moral hazard, the
impact of expected benefits should be similar on total indemnity and medical costs,
when the latters are properly deflated. 
In algebric terms, the model developed by Butler and Worrall is the
following :2
ln (I/J)    = "  + "  ln(B/J) + "  X (1a)0 1 2
ln(M/B)  = $  + $  ln(B/J) + $  X (1b)0 1 2
where I = expected indemnity costs per worker, M = expected medical costs per
worker, B = weekly indemnity amount, B = price of medical care per week per
worker, J = consumer price index and X = is a vector other control variables (to be
defined below).
From the results of the preceding multiple regressions, the claims reporting
and risk bearing moral hazard elasticities can be derived according to the following:
 ,  =  $  ; ,  = "   -  $  - 1 (2)r 1 n 1 1
where ,  = risk (real) bearing moral hazard elasticity and ,  = claims (nominal)r n
reporting moral hazard elasticity.  The intuitive arguments behind these results can be
stated as follows.  First, the change in the workplace riskiness due to risk bearing
moral hazard is captured entirely by the effect of expected benefits on average medical
cost per worker.  Second, claims reporting moral hazard can be deduced once one has
accounted for risk bearing moral hazard, and for the actuarial relationship between
changes in indemnity payments and changes in average claim costs (a one-to-one
relationship).
III. Data used in the Analysis
The analysis is based upon pooled time-series and cross-section data.  The
period covered in this paper goes from 1975 to 1992 inclusively, for the ten Canadian
provinces.  Hence, the sample contains 180 observations. The data were found in three
 Several difficulties had been encountered while constructing the sample3
data. Among them, the different definitions (for medical aid, rehabilitation
and compensation) used in the ten provinces, and even in one province
over time. So, these definitions had sometimes been modified in order to
be conciliated. The definitions employed in every WCB may be dissimilar
because each WCB is a totally different entity. However, since the
beginning of the 90's, there had been tendencies to bring some
homogeneity in the different Occupational Safety and Health
Administrations. Furthermore, another problem consisted of the non
availability of certain annual data, and gaps had to be filled using standard
techniques.
 Indemnity costs include payments paid for temporary and permanent4
disabilities and pensions.
 Medical costs include costs for medical aid and for rehabilitation.5
 The indemnity and medical costs used in this analysis include costs paid by6
the WCBs for the employers who pay assessment to the boards and also the
costs paid by the employers who self-insured (principally government
employers).
4
principal sources: Annual Reports of the different WCBs, publications of The
Association of Workers Compensation Boards of Canada (AWCBC) and of Statistics
Canada .3
Indemnity costs (I)  have first been deflated by the general consumer price4
index (CPI; 1986 = 100), while medical costs (M)  have been deflated by an index5
based on average total expenses per hospitalization day (Index; 1986=100). Secondly,
these costs were divided by the employment variable that consists in total employment,
including nonagricultural employment (which is covered by WCBs in Canada for a
few years) and  government employment (whose costs are included in the indemnity
and medical costs ). Figure 1 provides the trends for these two variables.6
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Figure 3
 So, the expected benefit variable (EXPBEN) is the sum of the proportion7
of workers receiving the minimum payment (MINCOM) times MINCOM,
the proportion of workers receiving the maximum payment (MAXCOM)
times MAXCOM, and the proportion between these borders times their
average benefits.  The computation of this variable was complicated by the
distinct income basis used with the nominal percentage compensation
(NPC), in the different WCBs, some provinces using 75 % of the gross
income and others using 90 % of the net income. So, when necessary, the
gross income amounts corresponding to 90 % of the net income were
calculated, which means taking account of the different provincial taxation
systems.
 Quebec's board was the first to change its replacement rate system, in 1979.8
In 1994, there are still three provinces using the 75 % of gross income as
nominal wage compensation: Prince-Edward-Island, Nova Scotia and
British Columbia. It is also noteworthy that the province of Manitoba
changed for 90 % of net income only in 1992, so that the Manitoba data
cannot reflect this change.
6
Two different measures of benefits were used in the models: the expected
benefit and maximum benefit payments. The expected benefit payments were
computed according to the method developed by Butler (1983). This method gives an
estimation of the indemnity payments for a typical worker given a province's
replacement rate, its minimum and maximum benefits, and the wage distribution of its
workers . 7
Butler and Worrall employed the proportion of insurance dollars that self
insure and its value square (P and PSQ) as sample selection corrections in all their
models, because their data did not include information about the firms that qualify for
self-insurance. Even if the data on which is based this analysis takes account of the
self-insured employers, so that there is no need for sample selection corrections, these
two variables were also utilized to take account for the effect of self-insuring on the
indemnity and medical care costs.
The models include a variable (RR dummy) that accounts for the change in
the replacement rate regime, when the replacement rate changed from 75 % of gross
income to 90 % of net income . This variable is interacted with the benefit variable as8
it is assumed that the change in the compensation basis leads to a more generous
system, this change is likely to correspond to an increase in the indemnity costs.
 The estimations presented here are those considered as most representative9
and comparable with Butler and Worrall, although a large set of estimations
were performed.  Firstly, we tried the Kmenta pooling method instead of
the OLS method. Secondly, we used another measure of benefits, the
average benefit. This measure proved to be interesting, the estimations
being even a little more significant than with the expected benefit measure,
but the nature of the results was not altered.
Thirdly, we used two different definitions for medical and indemnity costs.
For medical costs variables, one variable definition included only medical
aid costs, while the other  encompassed medical aid and rehabilitation
costs. For indemnity costs variables, one variable was indemnity costs for
temporary disability only, whereas the other one was the total indemnity
costs. Again ,the nature of the results presented here was not altered by
these changes.
Finally, we used two different definitions for the risky jobs variable, one
with only jobs relative to construction and manufacture industries and the
other less restrictive with jobs relative to construction and manufacturing
industries, but also to transportation industries and primary sectors.
7
The last variable used in the analysis is one that takes account for the
proportion of risky jobs (employment in the primary sector, the construction,
manufacturing and transportation industries) in each province.
IV. Results
The model has been estimated using ordinary least squares, with the two
different measures of benefits . The results are produced in Table 1. Following Butler9
and Worrall (1991), Panel A presents results employing the expected benefit payments
measure and Panel B, those using maximum payments measure.
8INSERT TABLE 1 HERE
9It is noteworthy that results using Canadian data are quite different from
those obtained by Butler and Worrall with American data. That divergence exists was
suggested by the steady or slightly increasing trend of medical costs, see Figure 1,
whereas American medical costs shown a downward tendency. This weak ascending
trend is probably related to the positive sign obtained for the log(medical costs)
estimates (" ), which implies a positive sign for the risk bearing moral hazard1
elasticity.  This is our first important difference from Butler and Worrall who have a
negative estimate.  Recall that their result implied that the reduction in
workers'accident-prevention actions due to better benefits was more than offset by
firms'safety investments or, in other words, that employers'responses were stronger
than employees'responses. 
This result is not necessarily surprising given the differences we described
between the Canadian and American WC systems.  First, more generous WC benefits
in Canada may induce less care by Canadian workers, while more rudimentary
experience rating mechanisms in Canada may also provide firms with less incentives
for safety.  So that, overall, more generous WC payments may be associated with more
risk in the workplace as we find.  
Our second divergence with Butler and Worrall is that the magnitude of our
benefit coefficients ($ ) are much smaller than theirs. In fact, none of them is greater1
than 1. For instance, the benefit coefficient in the first regression indicates that a 10
percent increase in expected benefits leads to a 5.6 percent increase in per worker
indemnity costs. This coefficient, combined with the actuarial relationship described
above and the "risk bearing moral hazard elasticity", leads to a "claims reporting moral
hazard elasticity" of -0.58. Table 2 presents the different estimated "moral hazard"
elasticities.
Table 2
Claims Reporting and Risk Bearing Moral Hazard Elasticities
Overall Moral  Hazard
(,  +  , )n r
Claims Reporting Moral Hazard
(, )n
Risk Bearing Moral Hazard
(, )r
-0.44265 -0.58371 0.14106
This counter-intuitive result is puzzling.  A priori, there is no theoretical
reason as to why the "claims reporting moral hazard" elasticity would be negative.
This may have to do with the way we defined the variables at stake here: 1) the
average indemnity cost and 2) the expected benefits.  Indeed, the average indemnity
cost may be varying because the denominator (employment) is changing.  In
 Indeed, Fortin and Lanoie (1992) show that, when they withdraw the10
variable related to the generosity of UI in their regressions, the coefficient
of the WC variable is substantially reduced, which is plausible given the
positive correlation between the generosity of the two regimes.
10
particular, at the end of the period under study, the recession has entailed a shrinking
of employment, which, ceteris paribus, has resulted in an increase of the average
indemnity cost, not necessarily related to workers'behavior toward
workers'compensation.  Similarly, the definition of the expected benefit variable (see
footnote 7) relies partly on the portions of the labour force entitled to the maximum,
minimum or average indemnity payment; so that a change in this variable may be due
to a change in the wage distribution and not in the intrinsic generosity of WC regimes.
Examination of the data shows that there was a decline in the proportion of workers
receiving the maximum insurable income.  As a consequence, the expected benefit
variable is decreasing through time, so that the weaker relation we find between
expected benefits and average indemnity cost is not implausible.  Therefore, given
these definitions, our results suggest that we may not be capturing entirely the
phenomenon of interest, i.e., the relation between the generosity of WC and the
incidence of claims.  Furthermore, Fortin and Lanoie (1992) have shown that, at least
in Canada, ignoring the generosity of unemployment insurance (UI) may bias the
estimate of the relation between the generosity of WC and the incidence of job
riskiness.  Indeed, given that WC is much more generous in Canada than UI, workers
heading to their dismissal may be tempted to take actions to benefit from WC instead
of UI.  Ignoring this fact may lead WC coefficients to be biased downward .10
Concerning the regressions using maximum benefits, the impact on
indemnity costs was expected to be smaller for maximum than for expected benefits,
since maximum benefits do not mirror indemnity costs as well as do expected benefits.
This is what we observe, coefficients relative to maximum benefits are consistently
smaller than those relative to expected benefits, but show the same sign. 
V. Conclusion
This paper has been exploring the Canadian context of workers'
compensation and has been particularly focusing on the estimation of moral hazard
effects. One of the major interest of this paper was to replicate, with Canadian data,
a study carried out by Butler and Worrall (1991). Those authors have developed a
simple model to separate claims reporting and risk bearing moral hazard in workers'
compensation. Risk bearing moral hazard reflects the worker incentive to carry more
11
risk and consequently experienced more accidents when benefits rise, while claims
reporting moral hazard mirrors worker incentive to file a claim.  
The estimation of these two moral hazard effects leads to results quite
different with Canadian data than with American data. Part of this may be due to
institutional differences between the two countries (generosity of WC, extent of
experience rating), while weaknesses in the methodology and in the definitions used
may explain the rest of the difference.  Further research with micro data would be
required to provide more insights on these issues. 
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1Table 1
"Moral Hazard": Indemnity and Medical Cost, 1975-1992
(statistique -t)
PANEL A PANEL B
Independant
Variables
Using Expected Payments Using Maximum Payments
log (indemn. costs) log (medical costs) log (indemn. costs) log (medical costs)
Intercept 0.75327(0.6333)
0.74435
(0.6405)
 2.1151
(1.329)
2.0991
(1.379)
1.4457
(1.993)
1.9724
(2.578)
-1.4774
(-1.603)
-0.43418
(-0.4546)
Expected benefits 0.55735(2.649)
0.59175
(2.874)
0.14106
(0.5008)
0.20271
(0.7515) - - - -
(Exp. ben.)× (RR
dummy) -
0.027489
(2.973) -
0.049257
(4.068) - - - -
Maximum
Benefits - - - -
0.43709
(3.421)
0.36608
(2.785)
0.78663
(4.845)
0.64597
(3.937)
(Max. ben.)× (RR
dummy) - - - - -
0.017377
(2.011) -
0.03442
(3.192)
LPOPRISK -2.2858(-11.59)
-1.8107
(-7.232)
-1.2730
(-4.820)
-0.42173
(-1.286)
-1.9139
(-8.906)
-1.6296
(-6.376)
-0.68607
(-2.512)
-0.12289
(-0.3852)
PSELINS
 (Prob. self ins.)
3.9733
(2.963)
4.3695
(3.318)
0.43841
(0.2443)
1.1484
(0.6657)
4.4468
(3.340)
4.6438
(3.510)
1.3524
(0.7993)
1.7426
(1.055)
PSELINS2
(Prob. self ins.)2
-8.5172
(-2.551)
-9.1083
(-2.787)
0.43643
(0.09765)
-0.62286
(-0.1455)
-8.6479
(-2.625)
-8.9653
(-2.743)
-0.43528
(-0.1040)
-1.0639
(-0.2607)
Ont -0.29881(-3.346)
-0.27914
(-3.189)
-0.03812
(-0.3188)
-0.00287
(-0.02504)
-0.26363
(-3.130)
-0.23950
(-2.840)
-0.093696
(-0.8754)
-0.0459
(-0.4361)
Man -1.4344(-11.83)
-1.2993
(-10.24)
-0.40057
(-2.467)
-0.15847
(-0.953)
-1.4511
(-12.12)
-1.3557
(-10.61)
-0.42826
(-2.814)
-0.23922
(-1.499)
Sask -0.70111(-9.015)
-0.20441
(-2.135)
-0.02258
(-0.2216)
-0.86961
(-12.36)
-0.79716
(-10.16)
-0.27619
(-3.089)
-0.13269
(-1.355)
Alb -0.65880(-8.523)
-0.57376
(-7.104)
-0.03939
(-0.3807)
0.11299
(1.068)
-0.60892
(-8.269)
-0.54731
(-6.916)
-0.03220
(-0.3442)
 0.08983
(0.9094)
CB -0.63379(-6.705)
-0.48278
(-4.580)
 0.07355
(0.5813)
0.34415
(2.492)
-0.56893
(-6.686)
-0.45285
(-4.432)
 0.023292
(0.2154)
0.25323
(1.985)
NB -0.86348(-8.750)
-0.85233
(-8.832)
0.16676
(1.262)
0.18673
(1.477)
-0.89241
(-9.280)
-0.88912
(-9.329)
0.18018
(1.474)
0.18671
(1.569)
NE -0.89638(-4.865)
-0.80180
(-4.385)
-0.53392
(-2.165)
-0.36444
(-1.522)
-0.97554
(-5.450)
-0.91577
(-5.092)
-0.54371
(-2.390)
-0.42532
(-1.895)
IPE -1.5906(-11.22)
-1.3974
(-9.130)
-0.51764
(-2.727)
-0.17137
(-0.8548)
-1.5836
(-11.80)
-1.4884
(-10.54)
-0.22258
(-1.305)
-0.03398
(-0.1928)
TN -0.23434(-2.870)
-0.24037
(-3.012)
0.35487
(3.247)
0.34406
(3.291)
-0.38122
(-4.752)
-0.37894
(-4.766)
0.19303
(1.894)
0.19754
(1.990)
R2 0.7699 0.7803 0.3777 0.4310 0.7760 0.7800 0.4540 0.4826
